Abstract-In this paper we consider the problem of revealing aggregated sensitive data without adding noise. The aim is to reveal some statistics from a data set in a way that the privacy of individuals is preserved in terms of differential privacy. This problem has been solved for many systems by adding some noise to the aggregated data or individual values (in distributed systems with untrusted aggregator). However, such approach leads to errors (due to adding noise) which are sometimes unacceptable in real life scenarios.
Introduction
Let us imagine a following problem. There is a set of users and each of them keeps a single value. We have to reveal some aggregated data (say, the sum of all single values) and preserve the privacy of individuals (say, modeled using standard differential privacy notion). In recent years there have been many very promising results, both for the case where the privacy is governed by a trusted authority (database curator) and for the case where the database is distributed (see for example [1] and [2] where the authors use combination of cryptography and privacy preserving techniques). However, the standard differential privacy has an obvious drawback which is a necessity of adding a carefully calibrated noise to the final answer for the query. This approach is not always satisfactory. In some cases we need to have exact aggregated data. Moreover, as pointed in some recent papers, adding noise may lead to significant errors of aggregated data. Therefore, even if having rough estimation is acceptable for a given scenario, the resulting statistics may be too far from the exact values (see [3] , [4] ) to be usable in practice. Finally, adding noise, specifically from a non-standard distribution, can be technically problematicespecially when the aggregated data may come from small, computationally constrained devices. These facts lead to a somewhat reluctant adaptation of the differential privacy notion in real life applications, despite its undeniable merits.
One may ask if it is possible to circumvent the problem of adding noise while preserving the differential privacy of users. Unfortunately, in the given paradigm of standard differential privacy, adding noise is inevitable. Moreover, if we assume that users operate independently and cannot cooperate on adding randomized values used to perturb the original data (which is often the case in distributed systems), the level of aggregated noise has to be Ω( √ n), where n is the number of users (as proved in [5] ).
On the other hand, observing some real-life applications of aggregation one can have an intuition that often it is safe to release aggregated data without adding noise and such act does not expose any individuals' privacy, as pointed out in the seminal paper [6] . One of classic examples is the average national income. It is clear that such an information says in practice nothing significant about the specific incomes of any of our neighbors, even though they took part in the survey. Even revealing the average income of employees in a big company should be secure in terms of privacy of individuals. In contrast, revealing the exact average income (or maximum income) in a small community exposes users to obvious risk of privacy breach.
This problem has already been considered in a few papers, namely [7] , [6] , [8] to mention the most significant ones, where the authors propose relaxations of the differential privacy model which "utilizes" the randomness inherently present in the data itself. Our work can be seen as a continuation of this line of research where the authors leverage adversarial uncertainty. However, in contrast to previous results we focused on detailed, non-asymptotic analysis of the relaxed model, which is motivated by practical needs. Moreover, we concentrate also on (locally) dependent data, which importance we justify in Subsection 3.2.
The intuition behind the approach in [6] is that in real life scenarios it is not very reasonable to assume that the adversary knows almost every record in the database. This assumption seems far too strong, yet it stands at the heart of standard differential privacy. Indeed, it would be a bit over the top to think that revealing the average worldwide income would in any way harm privacy of any single individual. However, according to differential privacy definition, that would be unacceptable. Intuitively we realize that if an average income (or other value) of a "large" set of participants is revealed, there should not be a privacy breach. The authors of [6] and their notion of Noiseless Privacy captures that intuition. Their approach allows database designer to check whether the data satisfies desired privacy parameters, and if it does, just reveal the aggregated value without adding any noise. If the parameters are not satisfying, then one has to use standard differential privacy techniques, i.e. add appropriate noise to the final value. However, for this approach to become a state-of-the-art technique for various kind of data aggregation problems, it has to be easy to use for practitioners.
The privacy of aggregated data may be quite often considered secure without additional noise as long as the data has enough randomness on its own from the observer's (attacker) point of view. In our paper we follow the model from [6] , yet present it in a more convenient way for our approach. We show that this definition is coherent with classic (computational) differential privacy -formally speaking it is an extension. This approach can just be seen as utilizing "uncertainty" that naturally appears in some data sources to hide the contributions of individuals in the aggregated outcome. We depict wide classes of data that can be handled without adding noise and also give the explicit privacy parameters instead of only asymptotic results. Due to explicitly given parameters, our theorems can be seen as "off the shelf" ways for a practitioner to check whether he can safely release the data without noise or not.
Our results and organization of this paper
In a nutshell the results of our paper can be summarized in a one sentence: For a quite wide range of types of data (even for moderate number of users) adding noise is not necessary for guaranteeing privacy of individuals.
In Section 2 we explain the motivations, recall the model from [6] in a way that is more convenient for our results and provide some formalism that can be seen as an extension of differential privacy notion. Section 3 is devoted to analysis of chosen classes of data. In Subsection 3.1 we focus on the case when from the adversary's perspective the aggregated data is a set of independent random values. Most important is the case discussed in Section 3.2, where we allow the adversary to know a priori some dependencies between data. Then in Subsection 3.3 we shortly discuss situation where the adversary can have some auxiliary information about a subset of database values.
In our paper we consider security guarantees for realistic size of data, since purely asymptotic approach seems to be inadequate for typical areas of application. That is, let us stress that we present formulas that can be used for deciding if revealing aggregated data from a given types of data is secure even for a moderate number of users. We try to illustrate some of our results with chosen examples and numerical results in order to demonstrate that they are adequate for real-life settings. At the end in Section 4 we recall some previous and related work with particular attention to differences and similarities with the seminal paper [6] . We conclude and outline the future work in Section 5. Since our paper is quite technical for the sake of clarity of presentation, some of proofs and discussions about the extended definition of privacy have been moved to the Appendix.
Model
Let us present an aggregation problem in a general way. In the system there are n users that may represent different types of parties (organizations, individuals or even sensing devices). Each of them hold a data record x i (for simplicity we assume it is a single value). The goal is to aggregate the data and reveal some statistics (say sum of the values). Note that the data set may either be centralized one, that means there is a database curator whose goal is to reveal the values in a private way (namely via adding some noise to the output), or a distributed one. In the case of distributed systems, the users themselves have to secure their privacy using both cryptography and privacy preserving techniques (see for example [1] , [9] ). Note also that this paper is about privacy and we focus on showing that there are certain data types which does not need any noise added to the output whether it is a centralized or a distributed case. That means one could for example run protocols from [1] , [9] with only the cryptographic part, without adding noises to the values, which turns out to be quite too big for practical applications in various scenarios (see [3] ).
We want to emphasize that we use model from [6] , yet we present it in a slightly different way, which seems to be simpler and more convenient for our approach. Moreover it shows direct descendance from classical differential privacy which may be considered as a special case of this model.
One may be tempted to think that treating users' values as random values is the same as randomizing them by adding noise. These cases however are substantially different as we have different distributions. Moreover, in the second case we need to take into account dependencies that naturally appear in real-life settings. Unfortunately, the analysis is more complicated at least for discussed classes of data and requires formal treatment that to the best of our knowledge cannot be reduced to previous results.
Applications The described framework can be used for a wide range of applications including networks of sensing environmental parameters, smart metering (e.g, electricity), clinical research, population monitoring or cloud services. Due to space limitation we do not go into detail. Most important is however that in all these areas there are natural cases, when we cannot fully trust the aggregator. This is typical in distributed systems with devices belonging to different operators. More details can be found in [1] .
Modeling privacy of randomized data. We use a privacy model in which the data (or at least part of it) is considered random, coming from a specific distribution. This kind of approach if quite natural in many scenarios-that is the knowledge of the adversary is usually limited. This "uncertainty" can be utilized. However, it needs a different definition of privacy than standard differential privacy as in [10] , because we have to take into account randomized inputs. Following the notion introduced in [6] we will call this approach Noiseless Privacy. Before we show its formal definition, we need to introduce a following Definition 1 (Adjacent Random Vectors). Let X = (X 1 , . . . , X n ) be an arbitrary random vector and let X be other random vector. We will say that vectors X and X are adjacent if and only if
for any i ∈ {1, . . . , n}.
This essentially captures the notion of data vectors adjacency similar to the one in [10] , but for random variables rather than deterministic values. See also that if for some deterministic vector x we have X = x with probability 1, then this definition of adjacency is the same as in [10] . Now we can formally define Noiseless Privacy in the following way Definition 2 (Noiseless Privacy). We say that a privacy mechanism M and a random vector X = (X 1 , . . . , X n ) preserve noiseless privacy with parameters ( , δ) if for any random vector X such that X and X are adjacent we have
Note that this, in fact, boils down to exactly the same model as used in [6] . Intuitively, this definition says that if data can be considered random, then the outcome of the coin flip of any single user does not significantly change the result of deterministic mechanism M , whether the user is added to the result, or removed from it. This is very similar to standard differential privacy. A more detailed comparison is moved to the Appendix. Throughout this paper we will use abbreviation ( , δ)-NP (as in [6] ) to denote noiseless privacy with parameters and δ. Note that we do not claim that this new model of privacy should be used instead of standard differential privacy. We rather see it as a generalization of the known differential privacy definition that can be useful for some real life scenarios. See that in Rem.4 (Appendix) we showed that this model is indeed more general than differential privacy, but if we fix the data as deterministic, it is essentially the same definition.
Whether or not (and to what extent) particular data can be considered random is of course an important problem to be solved by the data holder, and is beyond the scope of this paper. Note that also other papers in this line of research
has not yet dealt with this problem which may be a very interesting question for a future work.
See that in noiseless privacy, random data has natural self-hiding properties, even for mechanisms which are deterministic. Instead of relying on the randomness of mechanism (as in the standard differential privacy), we can sometimes rely on the inherent randomness of the data itself. We are especially interested in deterministic mechanisms in that model, as they have an obvious benefit of not introducing any errors, so the answer to a query is exact.
The most common and useful deterministic mechanism would be simply summing all data without adding any noise. In section 3 we show that mechanism M (X) = sum(X) already has quite strong noiseless privacy properties for various distributions of X. Translating into real terms this means that the exact sum can be revealed without the risk of privacy violation.
Results
First, let us recall some definitions and properties. We use binomial distribution with parameters n and p, which we denote as Bin(n, p). It is well known that if random variables X, Y are independent and have distributions Bin(n 1 , p) and Bin(n 2 , p) respectively, then X + Y has distribution Bin(n 1 + n 2 , p)
We denote the cumulative distribution function of standard normal distribution as Φ(x). Also, we refer to lattice distributions with step 1, which is a generic name for discrete distributions such that support of this distribution can be represented in the form {a + k : a = 0 ∧ k ∈ Z}. The abbreviation i.i.d stands for independent, identically distributed.
Independent data
Assume that we have a database X which consists of n values so X = {X 1 , . . . , X n }. Let us consider a simple scenario, where X i are i.i.d. random variables and X i ∼ Bin(1, p). We want to aggregate the sum of all these variables so we set M (X) = n i=1 X i ∼ Bin(n, p). We prove the following lemma:
We have
Proof of this lemma is quite simple, yet it requires some careful calculations, and is moved to the Appendix for completeness.
Now we can state a theorem which shows that i.i.d. binomial data has very strong noiseless privacy properties for a wide range of parameters. First we consider the case where δ is fixed and obtain so that the data with summing mechanism is ( , δ)-NP. Then we fix and calculate δ. Both cases are considered in the following Theorem 1. Let X = (X 1 , . . . , X n ) be a data vector where
On the other hand, if > 0 is fixed, we get
Proof: Let us begin with the first case, where δ is fixed. One obvious observation is that M (X) ∼ Bin(n, p). Using Chernoff bounds (see for example [11] ) for binomial distribution we get
We want to limit the tail probability by parameter δ, so we want to find a λ such that the right side of this inequality is equal to δ. This yields
Let us denote the set S = { µ − λ , . . . , µ + λ }, which is exactly the support of M (X) without the tails which probability we just limited by δ. Now we have to find such that, apart from the tails, the following condition is satisfied
It is easy to see that instead of checking all subsets of S, we can check only the single values, because taking a single value with a bigger ratio yields worst case bound. For that, we can use Lemma 1. We indeed have M (X) ∼ Bin(n, p).
Recall that we assumed δ P (M (X) = 0) + P (M (X) = n). This means that at least 0 and n are in the tail that we already limited by δ. Therefore, (np−λ) > 0 and (np+λ) < n. Applying Lemma 1 for X and λ we obtain that
for u ∈ S and |u − v| 1. Observe that
Now see that in our case, for X i ∼ Bin(1, p) i.i.d. we have data sensitivity 1. One can easily see that adding or removing a single data point can change the sum only by 1. Therefore we have
where X and X are adjacent vectors and = (n, p, δ).
The addition of δ comes from the fact that we bound the tails of M (X). Now we assume that we have a fixed > 0. Let α = e and w = p 1−p . We use similar reasoning as in Lemma 1. First let us consider p 1 2 . We are interested in the greatest integer k smaller than np, which does not satisfy the following
Now let us pick
α+w . We will bound the tail using Chernoff bound
Now we can pick δ 1 in the following way
When p > 1 2 we can do similar symmetric reasoning as before, we obtain
Now we pick δ which is max(δ 1 , δ 2 ), so we have
This concludes the proof, because we have found a bound for the subset of possible values which did not satisfy our required ratio. In the end we have
which concludes the proof. Applications and Significance Let us observe that in Theorem 1 for constant parameters p and δ we get
. It is also worth noting that for p close to λ n or 1 − λ n , can be large, although as long as p is constant, still approaches 0 with n → ∞.
Similarly, for p very close to 0 or 1 and for small n, the value of δ can be large. Nevertheless we see that δ is decreasing exponentially to 0 with n → ∞, so for sufficiently large n we still get very small values of δ, even if p was strongly biased.
To illustrate it, consider the following example Example 1. Take data vector X = (X 1 , . . . , X n ), where
Let us first fix δ = 0.01. Using Theorem 1 we obtain that it is ( , δ)-NP. One can observe that these privacy parameters are very good, despite small number of participants. Moreover, they decrease quickly with growing n.
To conclude, we can say that aggregated independent 0−1 random variables do not need any processing (including adding noise) to protect the knowledge about a single user. Let us note that this holds even if the parameter p is unknown (but is upper and lower-bounded ) and for example the aggregator aims at estimating it. So much for the simplest case. Let us move to the intermediate model where the data is seen as coming from different but still independent distributions. Let us recall two facts. First one is a known result in differential privacy literature. Fact 1 (From [10] ). Fix > 0 and δ > 0. Let c such that c 2 > 2 ln(
, where σ c∆ we have
where u and v are any real numbers such that |u − v| ∆.
Second fact is a well known theorem in probability theory, one can find it for example in [12] . Fact 2 (Berry-Esseen Theorem). Let X 1 , . . . , X n be a sequence of independent random variables. Let
, where C 0.5591.
The upper bound for constant C comes from [13] . Let us prove following lemma. Lemma 2. Let X = n i=1 X i , where X i are independent random variables having lattice distribution with step
and assume EX i = 0 and E|X i | 3 < ∞ for every i ∈ {1, . . . , n}. For u, v such that |u − v| ∆ we have P (X = u) e P (X = v) + δ, where = ∆ 2 ln(n) nσ 2 , and
The main idea for this lemma is to use Berry-Esseen theorem to deal with normal random variables instead of binomials. Then we use normal distribution properties to obtain appropriate and δ. The proof of this lemma is moved to the Appendix.
Before stating and proving our next theorem, we will introduce a following Definition 3 (Data sensitivity). We will say that data vector X = (X 1 , . . . , X n ) and mechanism M have data sensitivity ∆ if an only if
for every vector X that is adjacent to X.
Note that this bears close resemblance to the l 1 -sensitivity defined in [10] . More detailed comparison of noiseless privacy and standard differential privacy can be found in Appendix. Let us suppose now that we have X i ∼ Bin(k, p i ) and we want to aggregate
The following theorem shows what are the privacy parameters in that case. Theorem 2. Let X = (X 1 , . . . , X n ) be a data vector, where Proof: Let X be any vector adjacent to X. First we observe that adding or removing data of one user can change the sum by at most k, so the data sensitivity is k. In other words, we have
Now we want to use Lemma 2. Consider random vector
Lastly, Y i 's have lattice distribution with step 1 and are also independent. Therefore, we can apply Lemma 2 for ∆ = k to obtain
for |u − v| k. The inequality comes from Lemma 2 and the parameter is as follows
as we stated before, data sensitivity is k, so ∆ = k in formula from Lemma 2. Furthermore, parameter δ is also obtained
Formula for δ is a bit complicated, but we can greatly simplify it. First simple observation is that we have
Next, we assumed that σ
. It is easy to check that it gives 1. Then also e 3. Combining these observations we have
In the end we have
which is what we wanted to prove. Remark 1. One may easily observe, that if we assume that the data consists of n random variables and m deterministic values (i.e. known for adversary), then Theorem 2 still holds with minor changes. This is discussed in details in Subsection 3.3.
Remark 2. Theorem 2 can be extended for other than binomial distributions of {X i }. One only has to check if the sequence of random variables satisfies the assumptions of Lemma 2. The constants might slightly change (depending on the distribution), as in the proof of this theorem we used some properties of Bin(k, p i ) to get more elegant bound, but asymptotically the result stays the same.
Applications and Significance Theorems 1,2 and remarks concerning these theorems give us very general notion of privacy parameters for summing independent data. We also present an example. Example 2. Consider a data vector X = (X 1 , . . . , X n ),
where
Using Theorem 2 we obtain that it is ( , δ)-NP. Figure 3 shows how the decreases with n, while Figure 4 shows how δ decreases with n. We can see that for n around 4000 parameter δ is smaller than 0.05, which is a constant widely used in differential privacy literature, and decreases further. Also, note that for n 4000 the parameter is below 0.5 which also is a widely used constant in differential privacy papers (see for example [9] ). The parameters become even better with more users. 
Locally dependent data
In the previous subsection we gave a general treatment for privacy parameters for independent variables. However, in many cases the data has some local dependencies involved. Imagine a situation where we want to collect the data of yearly salary from former students of a specific university. Say, those that finished their education at most 5 years ago. Our goal is to obtain the average yearly salary of all students that finished their education during last five years. Now one can easily see that there will be some local dependencies between the participants as some of the students might work in the same company, launch a startup together or just work in the same field. This will affect their salary and therefore make it locally dependent. Such dependencies are modeled using dependency neighborhoods notion, which are defined as below Definition 4. A collection of random variables X 1 , . . . , X n has dependency neighborhoods N i ⊂ {1, . . . , n}, i ∈ {1, . . . , n} if i ∈ N i and X i is independent of {X j } j / ∈Ni . One can visualize the data as graph, which has edges denoting dependency between data points and the ith node has degree |N i |. We want to give a general approach to local dependencies scenario, so we do not assume anything about joint distributions of the dependent subsets. Note that in [6] the authors gave results for dependent data only for the simplest case of boolean queries, that is for queries f such that f : {0, 1} n → {0, 1}. They did not discuss dependencies for more complicated queries and data types. For the clarity of proof we will assume that X i ∼ Bin(1, p i ), however the theorem can be extended for a very large class of distributions in a straightforward manner. As previously, we want to take the sum of all our data and show privacy parameters for this mechanism.
We are going to take a similar approach as in Theorem 2. That is, we want to bound the distance between the sum of our data and normal distribution. Then, using standard differential privacy properties of normal distribution (described in Fact 1) we derive privacy parameters. However, this time we cannot use Berry-Esseen theorem to bound the mentioned distance, as the data is not independent. We use Stein's method (see for example [14] , [15] ), which allows to bound the Kolmogorov distance between two random variables. Apart from that, the presented reasoning is very similar to Theorem 2. Firstly, we introduce some notation and facts. Definition 5. Let X and Y be a random variables. Let µ and ν be their corresponding probability measures. We denote their Kolmogorov distance as d K (X, Y ) which is defined as
where F X (·) denotes the cumulative distribution function of X. Furthermore, we denote Wasserstein distance as d W (X, Y ) which is defined as
where H = {h : R → R : |h(x) − h(y)| |x − y|}.
These are standard probability metrics, their definition is also given in, for example, [15] . We also recall a useful relation between Kolmogorov and Wasserstein distance. Fact 3 (From [15] ). Suppose that a random variable Y has its density bound by some constant C. Then for any random variable X we have
Moreover, if Y ∼ N (0, 1), then for any random variable X we have
Lastly, we recall a theorem from [15] . Fact 4 (Theorem 3.6 in [15] ). Let X 1 , . . . , X n be random variables such that EX
. Let the collection (X 1 , . . . , X n ) have dependency neighborhoods N i , i ∈ {1, . . . , n} and also define D = max 1 i n |N i |.
Then, for random variable Z with standard normal distribution we have
This fact is obtained by using Stein's method. We will use these facts to prove our next lemma, which is stated in a following way Lemma 3. Let X = n i=1 X i . Assume that X i has lattice distribution with step 1 and also EX i = 0 and EX 4 i < ∞. Suppose there are dependency neighborhoods N i , i ∈ {1, . . . , n}, where D = max 1 i n |N i |. Let σ 2 = V ar(X). For u, v such that |u − v| ∆ we have Proof of this lemma is presented in the Appendix. Note that both in this lemma and in the next theorem we denote
as in previous subsection. Having introduced necessary definitions, facts and after stating Lemma 3, we are ready to prove the following Theorem 3. Let X = (X 1 , . . . , X n ) be a data vector, where X i ∼ Bin(k, p i ), having dependency neighborhoods N i , for i ∈ {1, . . . , n}. Denote the size of largest dependency neighborhood as
where C = 5 Proof: Let X be any vector adjacent to X. First we observe that adding or removing data of one user can change the sum by at most kD, so the data sensitivity is kD. In other words, we have
Now we want to use Lemma 3. Consider a random vector
. One can easily see that EY i = 0 and after simple calculations EY
Moreover, Y i 's have lattice distribution with step 1. Obviously, dependency neighborhoods stay the same and also variances. Therefore, we can apply Lemma 3 for ∆ = kD to obtain
where |u − v| kD. The inequality comes from Lemma 3 and the parameters and δ are as follows 
Combining it together we have
which completes the proof of this theorem. The result in Theorem 3 is very general, we assumed little about the dependency. Moreover, it can also easily be extended (just like Theorem 2) for wide class of other distributions. The extension to other distributions can be made by simply checking the assumptions and applying Lemma 3 (if possible). As one can see, the parameter δ in Lemma 3 is quite complicated, yet with careful treatment it can be simplified, at least for some distributions.
Auxiliary information
So far we have not discussed auxiliary information of the adversary. However, this can be easily obtained from our previous results. Let us assume that the auxiliary information of the adversary consists of all records (values) of a subset Γ of the database. Let |Γ| = d. Now it is easy to see that every theorem given previously is also true for adversary with auxiliary information, the only value that has to be changed is the value n in Theorems 1, 2, 3. Instead of n users contributing to adversarial uncertainty, we will have n − d users who, due to randomness in their data, make the aggregated value private. This is more formally stated in the following remark Remark 3. Let us consider an adversary with auxiliary information of all records of a subset Γ of the database. Let |Γ| = d. Then all previous theorems from this paper can be easily adapted to such an adversary by plugging n − d instead of n as the size of the database. This essentially captures the fact that all other users (about whom adversary has no information) still contribute to the randomness of the query. Moreover, if we assume that the adversary has auxiliary information about the whole database (that is |Γ| = n) then this model collapses to standard differential privacy, where no uncertainty comes from the data itself. This shows that indeed the standard differential privacy is a special, most pessimistic, case of this model.
This lets us make a simplified (yet useful in some cases) version of Theorem 3, which treats all the dependent records as an auxiliary information. Obviously this is an overkill, but it might be enough in the situations when most of the data is independent. Provided that we have m independent data points in our data vector, we can state and prove a following Theorem 4. Let X = (X 1 , . . . , X m , X m+1 , . . . , X n ) be a data vector, where for i m we have X i ∼ Bin(k, p i ) and independent. On the other hand, for i > m, X i are dependent such that each is dependent of at most D other data points. Assume that Proof: Let X be any vector adjacent to X. First we observe that the data sensitivity is kD. In other words, we have 
Lastly, Y i 's have lattice distribution with step 1 and are also independent. Therefore, we can apply Lemma 2 for ∆ = kD to obtain
where |u − v| kD. The inequality comes from Lemma 2 and the parameters and δ are as follows
. It is easy to see that it gives 1. Then also e 3. Combining these observations we have
which is what we wanted to prove. Note that the only thing we assumed in this theorem is the independence of some elements of data, and the data sensitivity. This theorem allows database curator to obtain different privacy parameters than from Theorem 3. If the number of independent records is much bigger than the dependent ones, the parameters are likely to be better than in Theorem 3, so it might turn out that the output of a query can indeed be published without a noise, despite negative answer from Theorem 3.
Previous and Related Work

Relation to results from [6]
Our paper can be seen as a continuation of the ideas introduced in [6] . The authors of [6] proposed a new insight considering relaxation of differential privacy which utilizes the uncertainty of the adversary. This was done in a contrast to standard differential privacy, which assumed that the uncertainty has to be injected by the randomized mechanism. Obviously the notion of differential privacy is quite pessimistic, as we assume that the adversary knows almost everything. In many cases it makes differential privacy unusable in practice. The necessity to add noise to the final output may render the data completely useless. Imagine situation where we want to do a taxation audit. The aggregator collects the amount of taxes paid by the individuals and then publish their sum. After adding a noise, this sum will be different than the tax due, but now we do not know whether it is because of the noise added, or if there is some tax evasion undergoing. Very similar example, and also some other, were given in [6] . This might be an extreme example, but nevertheless, a big magnitude of noise (say linear of the size of the data itself) would be problematic in most practical situations. One such case is discussed in paper [3] , where the magnitude of noises for practical cases is huge, despite good asymptotic properties of the protocol.
In our paper we use the same model as in [6] . However, here it is presented in a different way, which is more convenient for our proofs. The results we are giving are more detailed (non-asymptotic) and easy to use in practice and concern different types of data (namely Bin(k, p i ) for fixed k and p i ). To the best of our knowledge, previous work in noiseless privacy and its derivatives or generalizations consisted of asymptotic analysis only. The unknown constants hidden in the big oh notation makes it difficult to construct practical algorithms. Furthermore, we also give results for data with (limited) dependencies, which did not appear in [6] (apart from simple examples). Below we give a detailed comparison and discussion of the differences and similarities between our paper and [6] .
• The authors of [6] first give a few theorems concerning boolean databases and also boolean queries, that is f : {0, 1} n → {0, 1}, where n is the size of the database. These kind of results may be interesting theoretically, but for practical applications we were mainly interested in a bit more complicated query functions. Very interesting is Theorem 5 from [6] , where the authors consider a sum query, that is f (X) = n i=1 X i , where X i ∼ Bin(1, p) for some constant p. However, they do not explicitly show the best possible and δ satisfying ( , δ) noiseless privacy. They only show that when some inequality which involves is satisfied, the data with sum query is ( , negligible(n)) noiseless private. For a practitioner, this does not tell much, especially as this is an asymptotic result. Moreover, the negligibility of δ with respect to n is not very precise information, a practitioner would need at least the order of magnitude or, even better, an exact value.
• Observe that in our paper Theorem 1 gives explicit values of and δ, while Theorem 5, in [6] has the same assumptions and goal, but does not explicitly yield neither the value of , nor the exact value of δ. In our paper, on the contrary, we give an "off the shelf" theorem which lets any database or system designer simply decide if the model is appropriate and then plug in the values to our theorem. He will then receive privacy parameters which are satisfied by the database, then he can decide whether the parameters are sufficient or if he has to add some noise or use any classical differential privacy mechanisms. Furthermore, our results (Theorems 2 and 3) extend Thereom 5 from [6] . We give results for X i ∼ Bin(k, p i ) being independent random variables in Theorem 2 and also with some local dependence in Theorem 3. Moreover, using Lemmas 2 and 3 one can easily extend our results to other discrete distributions.
• The authors of [6] also propose a theorem (namely Theorem 7) which concerns so called real life queries. In our paper similar result can be seen a simple consequence of Theorem 2. However, we do not consider real valued functions, but instead work with Bin(k, p i ) for fixed k and p i . Our result could be extended for any discrete random variables. On the other hand, we do not suffer from limitations of Theorem 7 in [6] , where the authors assumed that the result of the query has to be O(log(n)). Moreover, from Theorem 3 we have a generalization for locally dependent data.
Other related papers
There are many other papers that should be mentioned as a related work. Apart from [6] there were also very interesting and important papers concerning various approaches to leveraging adversarial uncertainty in privacy, especially [7] , [8] .
Both in [7] and [8] the authors proposed a frameworks ("coupled-worlds privacy" and "Pufferfish", respectively) for specifying privacy definitions. They could be instantiated in various ways, one of which boils down to noiseless privacy. These papers are important extensions of ideas in [6] , however the main goal of the authors is extending and generalizing privacy definitions. Our paper, on the other hand, focuses on extending the types of data which have good noiseless privacy parameters and also on introducing dependencies in the data. Moreover, we focus on detailed results which can be easily applied in real-life scenarios of data aggregation.
Obviously, our paper is also strongly related to any work concerning data aggregation under differential privacy regime, whether the data set is centralized or distributed.
Our results can for example be used in [1] wherein authors construct a mechanism that allows the untrusted aggregator to learn only the intended statistics but no additional information. Moreover the statistics revealed to the aggregator satisfy differential privacy. The result is obtained by combining applied cryptography techniques to hide partial results with regular methods used for privacy preserving for the final result, which can be omitted under noiseless privacy regime, thus not introducing any errors.
There is a long line of papers concerning similar problems as in [1] , for example two other notable papers [2] and [16] . In both of them, the authors use a substantially different model of security. Moreover in the latter the users communicate between each other, while in [1] as well as in our paper we assume that there is a communication between aggregator and individual users only.
Note that most of protocols described in these related papers fail to provide the correct output even if only a single user abstains from sending his share of the input. The solutions for dynamic networks have been presented in [3] and [9] . Approach based on [1] was also focused on more advanced particular processing of aggregated data (e.g., evaluation and monetization) while keeping privacy of users is discussed in several papers ( [17] , [18] , [19] , [4] ). Another vain of protocols represent [20] , [21] wherein authors present some aggregation methods that preserve privacy, however they do not consider dynamic changes inside of the network. The latter also considers data poisoning attacks, however the authors do not provide rigid proofs. In [22] , [23] the authors present a framework for some aggregation functions and consider the confidentiality of the result, but leaving nodes' privacy out of scope. Clearly there are many papers discussing aggregation protocols without considering security nor privacy issues (e.g., [24] , [25] ). There is a long list of papers devoted to fault tolerant aggregation protocols ( [26] , [27] , [28] ) for significantly different settings.
One could use the notion of noiseless privacy, especially the explicit results given in our paper, to get rid of the noise addition (thus, the error introduced in result of a query) in many protocols in papers mentioned in this section.
As a related work we shall point also a huge body of papers dealing with differential privacy notions and their extension. The idea of differential privacy has been introduced for the first time in [29] , however its precise formulation in the widely used form appeared in [30] . Most important properties have been introduced in papers [31] , [32] . There is a long list of papers that can be seen as a direct extension of [29] i.e., [19] , [31] . In all that papers a substantially different trust model is used. Namely there is a party called curator that is entitled to see all participants' data in the clear and releases the computed data to wider (possibly untrusted) audience.
Paper [33] presents aggregation of elements of dataset from perspective of preserving differential privacy. The presented framework significantly differs from our approach in a few points. First of all, it uses adding noise to raw data.
An introduction to differential privacy can be found in [34] . An excellent, comprehensive description of recent results can be found in [10] .
Conclusions and Further Work
We pointed that in some cases it seems to be secure to reveal aggregated data without adding noise without exposing users to privacy threat. We have shown a wide class of data which satisfies Noiseless Privacy with explicitly given parameters. The results were also given for the locally dependent data. We have also presented some numerical results to visualize the size of parameters.
Many questions are left unanswered, however two of them seem to be most important both form practitioners' point of view as well as for the theory. We leave them as a future work.
• How the database (or distributed system) designer should decide about the level of randomness in the database? In other words, even though in many papers we are given various frameworks to instantiate a specific scenario, how should the practitioner decide which instance to use? A general method for such a problem would be of great practical value.
• We hope to find a more general description of data that can be aggregated without adding noise. A promising direction is to use notion of min entropy notion (see e.g., [35] ) of data source assuming limited dependencies between values kept by users.
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We would like to thank Professor Adam Smith for pointing us some fundamental papers in this field. more, we know that u ∈ [np − λ, np + λ] ∩ Z. First observe that we get the biggest ratio either for the smallest or greatest possible u. Moreover, if p 1 2 we get the biggest ratio for the smallest possible u. Therefore it remains to check these two cases, calculate 1 and 2 and pick = max( 1 , 2 ).
Let us begin with the case where p 1 2 . We have X ∼ Bin(n, p). One can easily check that the greatest possible ratio is for u = np − λ and v = (u − 1). We can bound it in the following way
Ultimately we are interested in the natural logarithm of that ratio. We have where |u − v| = 1. Now let us assume that p > 1 2 . In that case the greatest possible ratio is for u = (np + λ) and v = (u + 1). One can easily see, that we can simply consider Bin(n, 1−p) and apply exactly the same reasoning as before. That leaves us with In the end we found , which has a property that for all u ∈ [np − λ, np + λ] ∩ Z and |u − v| = 1 it holds that P (X = u) e P (X = v), which concludes the proof of this lemma.
Proof of Lemma 2.
Proof: To prove this lemma, we will use Facts 1 and 2 from Section 3.1. We have X = n i=1 X i and σ 2 = n i=1 V arXi n . Recall that X has a lattice distribution with step 1. Let u be any of possible values of X. We begin with taking
which is correct because of the distribution of X. Observe that EX i = 0 and E|X i | 3 < ∞, so we can use Fact 2. Let Z ∼ N (0, nσ 2 ). Now we have to return to our initial distribution. Again, we use Fact 2. During this reasoning we already obtained . We also have δ = 2δ 1 (1 + e ) + δ 2 1.12
(1 + e ) + 4 5 √ n .
Finally we have P (X = u) e P (X = v) + δ 1 (1 + e ) + δ 2 e P (X = v) + δ,
